Summary: The West Virginia Miners engaged in remarkable inter-ethnic rebellions in the early twentieth century, against the "feudal" conditions in the Mountain State's coalfields. This paper challenges the view that these actions were backed by an equally radical and class-conscious language based on Americanism. It shows how due to various barriers, ranging from ethnic differences to electoral interference, political involvement on the part of the miners was sporadic and unsuccessful, and they were unable to form a common, coherent political identity. Instead they articulated a broad and ultimately ambiguous appeal to "American" rights and values, which focused on the exceptionalism of West Virginia, and took the interpretation of Americanism to be self-evident.
However, while not necessarily disputing the general point that working-class Americans could espouse a coherent, specific and radical language based on appeals to American values, this paper will suggest that, for the West Virginia miners in the years 1900-1922 at least, this was not the case. It will argue that despite the appearance of unity in the act of struggle, the West Virginia miners did not form a coherent or stable political position either in the electoral sense, or in terms of a radical identity to match their actions. Instead they articulated a vague and ill-defined version of Americanism which focused on the specific problems of West Virginia, and made broad appeals for law and order and citizenship rights. However, these appeals were not located within a wider political or ideological framework, and were frequently presented as self-evident statements of faith, which ignored the fact that the rights and values associated with Americanism could be interpreted in very different ways.
All of the barriers against unity at an industrial level, which the West Virginia miners so spectacularly overcame, were even more potent in regard to forming a unified political stance. The majority of the state's miners lived in new, unincorporated communities, often company towns, created entirely for the purpose of producing coal. Carved into the Appalachian mountains they were often both geographically and culturally isolated. 7 Particularly in the early years, they were not part of an established political framework, nor, as new communities, could they draw on an existing political culture. This was reinforced by the temporary, transitory nature of life in the communities, in particular the remarkable mobility of the inhabitants, many of whom resided only temporarily within the state. When it is further taken into account that the majority of the labour force came from rural origins, and that this mobility was often a sign of continued links with an agricultural past, it begins to become clear why, within the semi-agricultural mining towns, the formation of a common political identity would be an extremely difficult process. 8 This prospect was further impeded by the cultural mix of the communities which, whilst surmountable around a set of demands relating to the specifics of the operators* abuses, was more significant on a political level. For example, the foreign-born miners were made up of various nationalities and hence, cultures and languages. 9 At a practical level this would inhibit the spread of political ideas within the mining communities, beyond demands which clustered around the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA). Moreover, the fact that many of the foreign-born miners intended only a temporary stay in the coalfield had an important impact beyond its immediate effect, limiting the electoral strength of the miners as a whole. By the end of the period under discussion only 10 per cent of this group had become naturalized citizens, and thus able to vote.
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Roger Fagge
For the black miners the comparative equality that they found in West Virginia contrasted with their experience in other states, notably in the absence of electoral restrictions. As a consequence the vast majority of black miners voted along race lines for the Republican party. For historical reasons, the Democratic Party did not attract black votes, and the Socialist Party of America (SPA) with its at best equivocal line towards racism, also secured little black support.
11 Indeed, the link between the black vote and the Republican party was so strong that there were allegations throughout this period that the operators in southern West Virginia recruited blacks to shift the state's political balance. 14 Nor was black support a one way process. As Trotter has shown, the black community, particularly after the war, won concessions both in terms of representation and legislation. In the class sense, however, this tended to bind black miners into an alliance with the emerging black middle class and, in turn, with the coal operators who dominated the Republican Party. The native West Virginians within the mining communities discovered that, as with every other aspect of their lives, the coming of the new industrial order destroyed the traditional pattern of politics. Previously their independent, rural way of life had been marked by local political identities, usually based on kinship. Elections were treated as social occasions, often taking place on Sundays or public holidays. 16 The new political framework, created and dominated by the coal interests, ran counter to this in almost every sense. The former mountaineers, therefore, isolated within the coal towns, often clung to their identity as "descendants of the pioneers" who had first settled the region and who still had a right to own the land. 17 Although this did not necessarily rule out the formation of a common politics with other groups, it did, when combined with the other barriers, make such a process more difficult.
Great though the above were as barriers against the formation of a common political identity, or political organization, it was inevitably the overarching power of the operators which proved most significant. 
26
The operators' domination of the political apparatus of the state, which the electoral frauds helped perpetuate, was also a cause of political alienation, and hence a barrier to political action. Both the Democratic and Republican parties were subservient to the coal interests, as were many of the county and state political offices. 27 This led to the defeat of legislation the operators deemed unsympathetic or, when such legislation was passed, as in the case of laws covering scrip and mine guards, ensuring non-enforcement.
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Consequently there was a tendency for the miners to withdraw from the political process and instead turn to the UMWA. 29 This helps explain why the pattern of industrial conflict, most notably in the march on Blair, was so intense and, in many ways, amounted to politics by another means. Indeed the intensity itself helped further focus attention on the specifics of battles in the industrial arena at the expense of a broader, more politicized outlook. There is also a sense in which the lack of a common politics became a further barrier against its formation -a catch 22 so to speak -as political movements or parties not only reflect changes in political identities, but they themselves are agents that stimulate change, helping articulate identity itself.
Considering the remarkably inhospitable circumstances which have been described, it is perhaps surprising that the West Virginia miners engaged in the level of political organization they did, rather than vice versa. Although never consistently successful, this activity took place both within the existing party framework and through third party politics.
Prior , 1974) 37 A similar independent campaign was run four years later when the veteran radical, Robert M. LaFollette, backed by various labor/left/progressive groups ran against the major parties for the Presidency, and secured nearly 5 million votes (16.5 per cent). 38 In West Virginia, however, despite efforts by local union leaders, including Mooney who once again ran for the House of Delegates, this time on an independent ticket, the total vote was only 37,724.
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Notwithstanding the Montgomery and LaFollette campaigns, the most consistent attempt at creating a genuinely independent labour politics, outside the established parties, was made by the SPA which was at its strongest in the state around the middle of this period. Although partially a response to the disillusion with the political situation within West Virginia, the advance of the SPA was also linked to the national political context, where the party presented an increasingly powerful political alternative. Under the inspirational, if sometimes inconsistent, leadership of Eugene V. Debs, the SPA had not only made electoral advances, 34 but increased its influence within the trade unions, including the powerful UMWA. 40 Thus at the 1912 annual conference the union voted in favour of "government ownership" of all industries, and added to the constitution the demand that miners be given "the full social value of our product". They also, while heavily rejecting specific support of the SPA, struck out the clause within the UMWA constitution which demanded political neutrality. 41 The more positive stance towards the SPA on behalf of the UMWA, the wider trade union movement, and the electorate generally, proved short lived, however, as divisions within the SPA, the war, state repression, and social and political changes led to a precipitous collapse in support. 42 This affected West Virginia as much as the rest of the US.
The rise, and indeed fall, of the socialist vote in West Virginia may have mirrored the national pattern, but it did so at a lower level. This point should be stressed as there has been a tendency, in the sparse historiography on the subject, to overemphasize the level and significance of SPA support within the state. Thus Corbin, for example, claims that by the middle of this period the SPA had "made strong inroads among West Virginia's industrial workers, especially among its coal miners", helping to create "a growing, viable state Socialist movement". unconvincing attempt to blame the demise on the "policies and actions" of Debs during, and in the immediate aftermath of, a short visit to the state during the Paint Creek strike. 44 On the contrary, as was established earlier, given the circumstances within West Virginia, any independent political activity was a remarkable achievement -rather than being somehow inadequate when compared with a mythical ideal type.
The . 45 Even at the height of the SPA's electoral power, therefore, West Virginia was recording less than the national average, and well below states which had a more vigorous socialist electoral presence. In the same election, for example, Debs received 16.5 per cent of the vote in Nevada, 16.4 per cent in Oklahoma, 13.5 per cent in Montana, 13.4 per cent in Arizona, 12.4 per cent in Washington, 11.7 per cent in California and 11.3 per cent in Idaho. 46 In the 1916 election the SPA candidate, Allan L. Benson, polled less than half the 1912 vote with 6,144 (2.1 per cent), while nationally the vote dropped to 518,113 (3.18 per cent). In 1920, with the incarcerated Debs again the candidate, a further drop to a dismal 5,609 (1.1 per cent) was recorded in West Virginia, compared with a small real increase nationally to 919,799 (3.42 per cent). 47 The weakness of the SPA vote revealed in these figures in many ways speaks for itself. However, state-wide results, particularly those in Presidential elections, tell only part of the story. If we look at individual counties in the 1912 election it becomes clear that the distribution of the vote was far from even. For example Kanawha and Fayette counties, both of which were embroiled in the Paint Creek dispute, recorded the first and third highest vote for Debs with 3,071 (20 per cent) and 1,428 (9 per cent) respectively. Similarly Ohio with 1,579 (10.35 per cent) and Harrison with 1,077 (7 per cent) polled over the average. 48 This was also reflected in the vote for state offices which, despite Debs' popularity and personal appeal, kept pace with the Presidential vote. 49 On a state basis the socialist candidate for Governor, W.B. Hinton, polled 14,900 votes, compared with Debs* 15,248, while all the other major offices attracted over 15,000 votes. 50 On a county level Hinton's vote sometimes exceeded that of Debs, as in the case of Kanawha where 3,380 votes were cast for the former, compared with 3,071 for the latter. 51 If we break down the vote within Kanawha county an even more interesting pattern emerges. Although the SPA came third overall, the party's ticket proved more successful within certain electoral districts. In the Cabin Creek district, heart of the strike zone, socialists were elected to every office, with the ticket polling 2,328 votes compared with 1,142 for the Republicans and 667 for the Democrats. The Democrats were also pushed into third place in two of the other eleven districts. All of this was in spite of allegations of electoral malpractice. Noting the failure to carry Kanawha county as a whole, the Wieeling Majority reported socialist allegations that their observers had been ejected from some polling stations, "so they don't know how many votes were stolen from them".
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Nor was the SPA vote solely explained by the concurrent strike. The vote may have increased, proportionally, at a higher rate than any other county, but even prior to this certain Kanawha districts had elected socialists. Thus in 1910 two UMWA members were elected as, respectively, Justice of the Peace and constable in the Washington district. 53 Furthermore, if we recall, it was these districts which at the end of the previous century had voted for radical candidates; something which Williams believes provided the basis for the later socialist successes. Creek district again returned the complete socialist ticket, increasing their "straight vote". 57 The significance of this pattern should not be missed. The overall socialist vote within the state was based on a disproportionate distribution between and within counties. The fact that these districts have attracted the attention of historians has helped create the distortion in the perceived strength of the socialist vote in the state as a whole.
Of course, this doesn't mean that the Kanawha socialist vote was insignificant. On the contrary, it reveals that a socialist presence could emerge, particularly where a "radical" tradition already existed. However, Kanawha, and more importantly, specific districts within the county, were an exception rather than the rule in this respect. Indeed, isolated amongst a largely non-socialist voting population, even Kanawha proved unable to sustain a significant socialist presence in subsequent years. Thus in 1916, as the SPA vote in the state dropped from 4 per cent to 2.1 per cent compared with 1914, Kanawaha, for example, fell to only 3.2 per cent. Within this the socialist vote in Cabin Creek was only 11 per cent, compared with 47 per cent two years previously.
58
These voting figures also underline the lack of correlation between industrial conflict and socialist voting patterns with, once again, the rise in socialist support during the Paint Creek strike being an exception rather than the rule. After all at the height of the Mine Wars the SPA were conspicuous by their absence with the dismal 1.1 per cent voteLogan, for example, only polled 27 votes for Debs.
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Of course it would be wrong, especially if we take into account the difficulties involved in mounting an electoral challenge in West Virginia in these years, to completely write off the socialist influence solely on these electoral figures, revealing though they are. Certainly the socialist press, particularly the Labor Argus (which was converted to socialism in 1910), and the Socialist and Labor Star, at times played an active and influential part in not only publicizing the abuses within the state, but in encouraging the miners to resist them -hence the unsolicited attention of Hatfield during the Paint Creek strike and, on behalf of the conservative and corrupt local UMWA leadership, the rival Miners'
Herald.™ Furthermore, some of the newer generation of local leaders who came to the fore during the Paint Creek strike, most notably Keeney and Mooney were, for a time at least, associated with the SPA, 61 as were some of the organizers sent in by the national organization like black 57 and an industrial union of sorts, but, being in the middle of a two year strike, they were certainly more interested in remaining alive than in listening to arguments in favor of dual organisation. 68 This was something which even an FBI agent in Charleston at the end of this period agreed with. He reported that he "never believed that there has been much, if any, outside political agitation at work" in the state.
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Not only did the FBI agent refute the suggestion of widespread outside agitation among the West Virginia miners, but he also described what he believed lay behind the miners' actions -in terms not far removed from Chaplin. The local union leadership, he argued, was of "an extremely radical type". However, crucially, he continued that, All of the radicalism seems to find vent in State issues and the radical elements have been almost completely absorbed in this struggle [. . .] little or no interest has been manifested in radical issues having a national or international application. Their minds and lives are fully occupied with the struggle immediately at hand [. . .] teachings and propaganda are directed almost solely against the coal .operators of the State, rather than against capitalistic interests everywhere. 70 The fact that an IWW activist and an FBI agent both stressed the way the miners focused on the specific state issues is as unusual as it is significant, underlining the previous evidence which suggested that due to the significant barriers within the state, the extension of the formidable displays of solidarity and direct action into a wider political movement did not take place, and there was no sustained political activity by the miners either within the existing political framework, or through independent alternatives. Instead, the focus on the "struggle immediately at hand", rather than broader class concerns, led to an emphasis on the denial of rights; particularly the right to join the UMWA. The union thus became doubly significant, both as an example of operator interference in the miner's freedom of action, but also, as the only "alternative source of institutional power", as the potential vehicle, symbolically and practically, for bringing about change. 71 To those engaged in the struggle to establish the union in West Virginia the compromises and contradictions of union policy were often lost beneath a more general faith in the power of the idea of unionism, and its role in remedying the wrongs they experienced. As Winthrop D. Lane put it, "Keeney has no carefully thought out 79 Polish-born UMWA organizer, Albert Manka, complained that "I always thought this was a free country, but I have found there isn't much liberty in the State of West Virginia for a poor working man". 80 Similarly underneath the headline "Slave Drivers", the Labor Argus reported that a mass meeting on Cabin Creek had described the guard system as "unnecessary and
